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Reaching Disagreement
David R. Hiley
Professor of Philosophy

J

ohn Courtney Murray, the Jesuit theologian,
shrewdly observed that disagreement is a difficult thing to reach.* Perhaps the biggest challenge in a democracy such as ours – a democracy
composed of people with many different religious
and cultural backgrounds and ethical outlooks –
is how to reach disagreement. Some of the most
challenging and controversial issues we face often
turn on differences among us about fundamental
values, differences that characterize a pluralistic
society. Consider, for example, the continuing
debate about abortion in the United States. For
some, fetuses are human beings and abortion is
always wrong because it intentionally ends the
life of a human being. For others, the risk or
consequences of continuing a pregnancy might
sometimes be sufficiently serious that an abortion
should be permitted under these circumstances.
For still others, moral decisions are essentially
private matters and women should be allowed to
decide for themselves what to do when faced with
an unwanted pregnancy. Public opinion has been
roughly evenly divided about whether abortions
should be illegal, legally allowed under some
circumstances, or left to individual decision, and
the division of opinion has remained relatively the
same for many years. The differences among these
positions run to the deepest level of our moral
outlooks about the sanctity of life, the moral significance of risks to health, and women’s right to
make choices about their own reproduction. Life,
risk, and choice are not unreasonable fundamental
concerns. Disagreement at such a fundamental
level is likely to persist; yet despite the persistence
of moral disagreement, we must arrive at laws and
policies that govern us all.

the face of persistent moral disagreement about
fundamental values. Should there be a ban on human embryonic stem cell research or should it be
permitted and even supported with federal funds?
Should everyone have reasonable access to basic
health care? Should same-sex couples be allowed
to marry? Should we intervene in the Darfur region of Sudan to protect civilians from the Janjaweed? We are deeply divided about each of these
issues and our disagreement can often be traced to
the different values that we believe are most importantly at stake. Are the therapeutic benefits derived from stem cell research more important than
the value of a human embryo? Is health care a
basic right or a market commodity? Is homosexuality immoral or not? Or is marriage most importantly about gender or about commitment? Is the
conflict in Darfur a civil war or genocide? And if
it is genocide, do we have a responsibility to prevent genocide in another country? It is possible
for reasonable people to arrive at different answers
to many of these questions because they disagree
about fundamental values. In a democracy characterized by a diversity of cultural, religious, and
ethical backgrounds and perspectives, how should
we deal with the moral differences that are often
at the root of our policy disagreements?
Unfortunately what we too often experience is
discouragingly unhelpful: people shouting at one
another from across the room or picket line, politicians vilifying those who disagree, commentators
who polarize rather than illuminate issues, news
media that gravitate to the heat of the controversy
like moths to the flame. Intolerance, divisiveness,
and hostility have come to dominate the public
square.

There are many other issues we face that share
the challenge of arriving at policy decisions in

Given the incivility of many of our disagreements, it is not surprising that some of us merely
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disengage, becoming indifferent to the issues and
uninterested in the political and policy debates
about them. But indifference is as unhelpful as
intolerance because these issues are important, as
important as they are divisive. They deserve our
considered attention and our democracy deserves
better than the spectacle that too often passes for
deliberation about our most complex and controversial disagreements. So how might we do
better?
Perhaps one place to begin is by thinking about
disagreement itself, its place in democratic culture,
and what it requires of us.
There are, of course, different kinds of disagreement. You think the tower is 100 feet high and
I think it’s 120 feet. There is a fact of the matter
here and the disagreement is settled by measuring.
But the disagreements that divide us are not like
this.
Some argue that what’s happening in Darfur
is genocide and that the U.S. should intervene.
Others argue that it is civil war that should be
left to Sudan to work through. What kind of
disagreement is this? It is not so much a disagreement about facts as about definitions. There is a
United Nations Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that
defines what a genocide is and the disagreement
is about whether the violence in Darfur meets
the criteria agreed to in the convention or not.
It matters what we call it since international law
allows intervention by another country to prevent
genocide but not civil war.
I believe that Creation Science is a scientific
theory that should be taught alongside Evolutionary Theory in biology classes. You think Creation
Science is religion and has no place in a biology
classroom. This disagreement is somewhat like
the Darfur case in that it is in part about what we
mean by scientific theory, but genocide – at least
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for now – is a relatively settled concept in international law, and what theory is and what constitutes a scientific theory are relatively less well
settled, though there is a substantial body of tradition and scholarship to draw from to formulate
criteria. But this is a disagreement about religion
in relation to science, a disagreement that dates
back to the earliest years of the Christian era.
A final example: I believe that an embryonic stem
cell is a human being but you don’t. What kind
of disagreement is this? It is not really a factual
disagreement like the height of the tower, since it
is not about the biology of stem cells but about
whether they have the right to life that human
beings have. And there are no international agreements that specify what it is to be a human being.
What there is are different religious and ethical
traditions, some which believe that the right to life
begins at conception and others that believe differently, including some outlooks that would deny
that there is any right to life at all.
What is expected of reasonable people whose
disagreements arise primarily from differences
about values, especially when decisions must
be made about laws and policies that affect us
all? How might we do a better job of deliberating about differences in values than we currently
experience in politics, the media, and the public
square?
We might begin by accepting that disagreement
is not necessarily a bad thing and that healthy disagreement is important for a healthy democracy.
John Stuart Mill recognized that a free society is
best served by maximum liberty of thought and
discussion and that giving fair hearing even to repugnant opinions serves liberty. Tolerance requires
that we accept that those who disagree with us are
not stupid, villainous, unpatriotic, or fools. They
may have good reasons for their views and we
must be open to those reasons and be prepared
to give reasons for our own. “To refuse a hearing
to an opinion because they are sure that it is false
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is to assume that their certainty is the same thing
as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion
is an assumption of infallibility.”** Diversity of
opinion and reasoned disagreement allow us to
exchange error for truth or arrive at a more considered judgment when we can, but as important,
to agree to disagree when we must. We may never
resolve some fundamental moral disagreements,
but we still must find ways to seek common
ground, to deal with such reality as dangerous
pregnancies, debilitating diseases, unfairness, and
catastrophes of war, even when we disagree.
–

** John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Hackett
Publishing Co, 1978, p. 17. Originally
published in 1859.
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